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SOME ASPECTS OF JOINDER OF CAUSES
EDWARD Q. CARRt

CONTEMPORARY reforms in practice and procedure include the
removal of many of the restrictions covering the joinder of
-'
causes of action in the complaint. The policy of modern statutes is to
encourage joinder of causes. Typical of this trend is the statutory
system of joinder of parties and causes which is now in effect in New
York State.' The system bears the strong imprint of equitable principles.
A favorite ground of equity jurisdiction has been the prevention of
a multiplicity of suit. Purely as a matter of pleading, equity permitted
the joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant where they had a common
interest in the subject matter of the bill. But further than this, equity
recognized the prevention of multiplicity of suit as an independent
and substantive ground of equity jurisdiction and invented the remedy
known as the bill of peace.2 A bill of peace combined the two-fold
functions of a restraining order and an order of consolidation. Numerous
parties plaintiff who were threatening to sue or were actually suing the
same defendant in different actions at law, were in a proper case enjoined
by a bill of peace from prosecuting their actions, and the issues involved
in the numerous law actions were tried and disposed of in a single equity
suit, the equity plaintiff being the prospective or actual defendant at
law, and the law plaintiffs becoming defendants in equity, The bill of
peace also functioned where a single plaintiff had threatened to sue or
was actually suing different defendants in numerous actions at law.2
Equity enjoined the bringing or the further prosecution of the numerous
law actions, the position of the parties again being reversed, the law
defendants becoming plaintiffs in equity, and the law plaintiff becoming
the defendant in the equity suit.' The early rule with respect to a
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT (1921) § 209, 211, 212, 213; (1935) § 258.
2. In some of its earlier opinions the New York Court of Appeals held that the prevention of a multiplicity of suits was in itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court
of equity even though no other element of equity jurisdiction was present, New York
& N. H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592 (1858); Supervisors of Saratoga County v.
Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219 (1879). In a recent case, however, the court intimates that prevention of multiplicity of suits alone is not sufficient, but there must be some other ground
of equitable interference present. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 263
N. Y. 382, 197 N. E. 321 (1935); (1936) 5 FORDHAx L. REV. 171.
3. In addition to the cases mentioned, a bill of peace was sometimes granted to restrain
repeated actions by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. 1 PoMERoY,

EQuITY

(4th ed. 1918) § 245.
4. While ordinarily the bill of peace has been used to enjoin the prosecution of
numerous actions at law, the bill may also be maintained to prevent multiplicity, by
JURISPRUDENCE

restraining numerous actions in equity.

Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637 (1871);

Alleghany & K. R. R. v. Weidenfeld, 5 Misc. 43, 25 N. Y. Supp. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
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bill of peace was technical and narrow. It was necessary, in order for
equity to exercise its jurisdiction, that there exist among the numerous
individuals or between each of them and their common adversary a
common right, a community of interest in the subject matter of the controversy, or a common title from which all of the separate claims arose.5
Gradually a more liberal view was adopted by Courts of Chancery and a
bill of peace issued even though no common right, title or community
of interest in the subject matter of the action existed among the numerous
parties, provided there was a common question of law or fact involved
in the general controversy.0
The New York statutes governing the joinder of parties and causes
are remedial in character and have as their object the prevention of a
multiplicity of suit. The so-called liberal rule governing bills of peace
in equity has been woven into the statute governing the joinder of
plaintiffs so that it covers both actions at law and actions in equity. A
community of interest in a common question of law or fact arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions, is the test of joinder of
plaintiffs.7 While the statutes governing the joinder of parties defendant
do not in so many words state the requirement that there be a community
of interest among the defendants in a common question of law or fact,
this requirement is to be read into these statutes.8
During the year 1935 the legislature of the State of New York made
an important change in the statute governing the joinder of causes of
action. Former Civil Practice Act Section 258, was repealed and a
new Section 258 added, which reads as follows:
"Section 258. Joinder of Causes of Action. The plaintiff may unite
in the same complaint two or more causes of action whether they are
such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, provided that
upon the application of any party the court may in its discretion direct
a severance of the action or separate trials whenever required in the
interestsof justice"Y
The new statute is patterned after similar statutes and rules of
practice in England"0 and New Jersey." The scope and effect of the
statute will necessarily have to await the construction placed upon it
by the courts, but an insight into the motives behind its passage can
5. 1 Po~maoy, op. cit. supra note 3, § 268.
6. Id. § 269.

7. N. Y. Cmv. PRAc. Acr (1921) § 209.
8. Bossak v. National Surety Co., 205 App. Div. 707, 200 N. Y. Supp. 148 (Ist
Dep't 1923); Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dep't
1924).
9. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 339, in effect Sept. 1, 1935.
10. English Practice Act, Order 18, Rule 1.
11. N. J.PRAc. ACr, §§ 6 (2), 11; N. J.Rurxs or PRAc. 21.
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be gathered by comparing it with its predecessor, the former Civil Practice
Act Section 258. As previously constituted, the Section provided that
the plaintiff might unite in the same complaint two or more causes of
action, whether they be legal or equitable, provided they fell within
one and the same subdivision of the Section and provided further that
they were not inconsistent and did not require different places of trial.1"
The scheme of the statute classifying the different types of actions and
segregating them into the different subdivisions seems to have rested
on purely arbitrary grounds. X could not unite in the same complaint
against Y, a cause of action on contract and a cause of action in replevin
because they did not belong to one and the same subdivision of the
Section. The requirement, that the causes joined must belong to one
and the same subdivision of the Section was not imposed where the
claims arose "out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with
the same subject of action" as set forth in subdivision 9 of the statute.
Therefore X could unite in the same complaint against Y a cause of
action on contract and a cause of action in replevin, provided they both
arose "out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the
same subject of action ...."
As compared to the arbitrary confinements of the other subdivisions of
the Section, subdivision 9 of the former Civil Practice Act Section 258
12.

Former N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1921)

§ 258 read as follows:

"JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint two or more causes of action,
whether they are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or both,
where they are brought to recover as follows:
1. Upon contract, express or implied.
2. For personal injuries, except libel, slander, criminal conversation or seduction.
3. For libel or slander.
4. For injuries to real property.
5. Real property in ejectment, with or without damages for the withholding
thereof.
6. For injuries to personal property.
7. Chattels, with or without damages for the taking or detention thereof.
8. Upon claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law,
9. Upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with
the same subject of action, whether or not included within one or more of the
other subdivisions of this section.
10. For penalties incurred under the conservation law.
11. For penalties incurred under the agricultural law.
12. For penalties incurred under the public health law.
It must appear upon the face of the complaint that all the causes of action so
united belong to one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section; that they are
consistent with each other; and it must appear upon the face of the complaint, that
they do not require different places of trial.
A provision of statute authorizing a particular action, or regulating the practice
or procedure therein, shall not be construed to prevent the plaintiff from uniting
in the same complaint two or more causes of action pursuant to this section".
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was undoubtedly intended by the legislature to be a concession towards
liberality of joinder of causes of action, in the interest of prevention of
multiplicity of suit. But the use of the words "Upon claims arising out
of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action . . ." rendered the subdivision ill adapted to clear construction at the hands of the courts. Referring to these identical words
as used in Section 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure from which former
Civil Practice Act Section 258 was derived, the Court of Appeals with a
touch of cynical humor said:
"Neither, in our iudgment, can it be said that the causes of action are
brought to recover 'upon claims arising out of . . . transactions connected
with the same subject of action' . .. which phrase has been said by a distinguished judge to be 'well chosen ... because it is so obscure and so general
as to justify the interpretations which shall be found most convenient and
best calculated to promote the ends of justice'. (New York & N. H. R.R. Co.
v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 604)." 13
The bulk of the decisions in the past, having to do with the joinder
of causes of action, have related to the construction to be placed
on the words "arising out of the same transaction or transactions
connected with the same subject of action" found in former Subdivision
9. Some of these decisions served only to increase confusion and doubt
in the mind of the practitioner. Typical of the narrow refinements and
distinctions which arose in connection with Subdivision 9 are the
following: If A assaulted B and while making the assault spoke defamatory words of B, causes of action for assault and for slander could
not be joined in the same complaint, 14 yet if A trespassed upon B's
land and while committing the trespass assaulted B, B could join causes
of action for trespass and assault in the same complaint, 11 for while in
the former case it was held the claims did not arise "out of the same
transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action",
in the latter it was said they did."
A case where there was a chance to avoid a possible multiplicity of
suit by joinder of causes in the same complaint but where the opportunity
had to be passed by, because of the narrow construction placed on
Subdivision 9 of Section 258, involved the sale of a gun by A to B.
13. Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7, 16, 148 N. E. 771, 774 (1925). Pomeroy in his work
on Code Remedies concluded that the words under discus,con did not apply to actions
at law but only to those in equity. PoaMMoY, CODE Ri.rmizs (3d ed. 1893) § 475.
14. Paul v. Ford, 117 App. Div. 151, 102 N. Y. Supp. 359 (Ist Dep't 1907).
15. Doyle v. American Wringer Co., 60 App. Div. 525, 69 N. Y. Supp. 952 (2d Dep't
1901).
16. These two decisions construing N. Y. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 484 were authority as
to former N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1921) § 258 which was identical in language with the
Code section.
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B was injured by the explosion of the gun and in his complaint joined
a cause of action for breach of warranty with a cause of action for
negligence. The joinder was held bad on the ground that the claim
did not arise out of the same transaction or transactions connected with
the same subject of action. 11 The bewildering hodge-podge of decisions
arising from the judicial construction of Subdivision 9 of Civil Practice
Act Section 258 was largely instrumental in the repeal of the section
and the adoption of the present Section 258 which appears to permit
joinder of causes of action without restriction save for the discretionary
power vested in the court to "direct a severance of the action or separate
trials whenever required in the interests of justice."
To attempt to formulate rules governing the joinder of causes of action
under a statute which in itself contains no words of limitation and
which seemingly leaves the question entirely to the discretion of the
court might appear both presumptuous and futile. Yet if the statute
is to perform satisfactorily it is not enough to say categorically that
each case of joinder will be judged on its own merits and upon its
own peculiar set of facts. It is essential to recognize that two distinct
classes of cases will arise in which the question of joinder of causes will
be governed by entirely different considerations.
In the first class may be grouped actions brought by a single
plaintiff against a single defendant in which a number of different causes
of action have been combined in the complaint. It is in this class of cases
that the reforms intended to be accomplished by the new statute will
be fully felt. Joinder of causes is no longer limited to actions of certain
types nor need there any longer be any inquiry as to whether the
claims arise out of the same transaction or transactions connected with
the same subject of action. The man who is assaulted by his neighbor
and at the same time slandered may now sue for assault and slander
in the same complaint. The purchaser of merchandise which proves
defective may sue the vendor in the same action for breach of warranty
and for negligence. It is fair to assume in this first class of cases that
the discretionary power of severance vested in the court by statute,
will only find room for exercise where the objection is raised that
the causes of action joined are inconsistent and therefor mutually
exclusive, 8 or where in rare cases because of statutory provisions the
17.

Reed v. Livermore, 101 App. Div. 254, 91 N. Y. Supp. 986 (3d Dep't 1905).

18. Inconsistency between causes of action cannot exist unless they arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions. Hill v. McKane, 71 Misc. 581, 128 N. Y. Supp.
819 (Sup. Ct. 1911). Former N. Y. CIV. PRAc. Act (1921) § 258 expressly required that
the causes of action joined, he consistent and that different places of trial be not required. These limitations on joinder have been eliminated from the present statute,
but it is conceivable that an application for a severance might still properly be made to
the court on the ground of inconsistency or the necessity of a different venue for trial.
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causes joined require a different venue for trial or where finally the
broad ground is urged that the joinder will confuse the issues and render
a fair trial impossible.'
A second class of cases is composed of those in which controversies
involving a number of plaintiffs or defendants have been assembled together in the same complaint. The problem has now become one both
of joinder of parties and causes. Obviously the question presents itself
whether the propriety of joinder in the complaint is to be determined by
the statute relating to joinder of causes of action standing alone or
by this same statute read in the light of the kindred statutory provisions
governing joinder of parties. To adopt the first alternative would be in
effect to hold that the new statute governing joinder of causes of action
had submerged and rendered obsolete the statutes relating to joinder of
parties. It would be the equivalent of saying that the joinder of causes
of action in all actions, whether by a single plaintiff against a single
defendant or involving multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, is
subject to no further restriction than that of the reserved discretionary
power vested in the court to sever causes of action in the interest of
justice. On the other hand to adopt the second alternative is to recognize what has been the previously accepted rule, that the statutes
relating to joinder of parties and causes are part of a flexible system
and intended to be read together as a whole.20
Courts of equity animated by motives of practical expediency devised
the remedy of a bill of peace to do away with a multiplicity of suit.
Both parties and causes were joined in the bill under circumstances which
would have been impossible in the courts of common law. The granting
of the remedy rested in the sound discretion of the Chancellor. This
discretionary power was controlled by the knowledge that not all
causes of action could be joined in the bill. A bill which prayed for
relief against different defendants on independent and unrelated transactions was demurrable on the ground of multifariousness.'
There
had to be at least a basic question of either law or fact common to all
parties and causes embraced within the bill. Furthermore, the bill had
to result in a consolidation and simplification of the issues else its pur19. By analogy it would seem that the objection that the joinder of causes vill prevent
a proper trial of the issues, might well be left to the good judgment of the trial court.
Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924).
20. Sherlock v. Mlanwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dep't 1924).
21. Herndon v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 135 (1910). BiSjoinder of causes at Common Law and under the New York Code of Civil Procedure =as
ground of demurrer. N. Y. CODE CIv. Paoc., § 488 (7).
With the advent of the
Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil Practice, effective October 1st, 1921, misjoinder ceased to exist as a ground of demurrer to the complaint and a new remedy was
given to the defendant of making a corrective motion pursuant to Rule 102 of the Rules
of Civil Practice, to compel service of an amended complaint. The motion had to be noticed
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pose failed of accomplishment. 2 Modem statutory provisions liberalizing
the joinder of parties and causes and permitting the consolidation of
actions have it is true, supplanted to a large extent the bill of peace.
Yet the principles underlying the bill still serve as a guide, in construing the statutes and in solving ever recurring questions of joinder.
The discretion vested in the court by statute to permit joinder of causes
of action or to direct a severance is comparable with the discretion
exercised by the Chancellor in granting a bill of peace.
In cases involving multiple plaintiffs or defendants it seems proper to
draw the conclusion that the sweeping provisions of Civil Practice Act
Section 258 governing joinder of causes of action are intended to be
supplemented and limited by the statutes governing joinder of parties.
It is not to be assumed that X as plaintiff may without restriction,
join separate and independent causes of action in his complaint against
A, B, C and D or that X, Y and Z as plaintiffs may unite in the same
complaint separate and distinct causes of action against the defendant A.
To justify joinder in multiple party actions, there must be present
a common question of law or fact in the causes of action united. Otherwise hopeless confusion would ensue. The common question should
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions but no longer
need it be "connected with the same subject of action". Those vague
and mysterious words are no longer found in any statute.
Lest it be said that the placing of restrictions on the joinder of causes
of action in the complaint is out of harmony with the spirit of the new
statute, let it be remembered that "the purpose of procedure is order, and
without order there cdn be no satisfactory or uniform enforcement of
substantive law". 3
by the defendant within twenty days from the service of the complaint, Rule 105 of
the Rules of Civil Practice. Misjoinder of causes of action has now been eliminated as
a ground of motion under Rule 102. The rule as amended and effective September 1st,
1936, reads as follows:
"RULE 102. Motion to correct pleading.

If any matter contained in a pleading be so indefinite, uncertain or obscure that the
precise meaning or application thereof is not apparent, or if there be a misjoinder of

parties plaintiff, or a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant, the court may order the
party to serve such amended pleading as the nature of the case requires".

The words "or if causes of action be improperly united" previously appearing after the
word "defendant" have been omitted. The defendant under the broad provisions of N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. Acr (1935) § 258 may now move at any time during the pendency of the
action for an order of severance.

22.

1 PommaOR, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 251%.

23. Todaro v. Somerville Realty Co., 138 App. Div. 1, 6, 122 N. Y. Supp, $09, 513 (2d
Dep't 1910).
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